General methodology
The Mathematics of the Brain (MoB) project is initiated by the DARPA DSO Mathematical Challenge One: Develop a mathematical theory to build a functional model of the brain that is mathematically consistent and predictive rather than merely biologically inspired. This section discusses some unique features of the MoB project that distinguish it from other state-of-the-art projects aimed at the development of the mathematical (computational) theory of the phenomenon of information processing in the human brain. In what follows we explain the basic principles underlying the general methodology of the MoB project.
The problem of system integration
The main thrust of the MoB project is to tackle the problem of system integration in brain modeling and cognitive modeling. Currently there exists a large and rapidly growing set of different computational models of what can be loosely referred to as the parts of the brain and/or the parts of the brain's behavior. At the same time, very little attention is paid to the question as to how (and if) such partial models can be integrated in a mathematical theory of the whole brain as an integrated computing system. We consider this question to be crucial for any consistent mathematical theory of the human brain and human cognition.
Anyone who was involved in a nontrivial reverse engineering project can safely say that, in real life, it is seldom (if ever) possible to reverse engineer and understand parts of an unknown integrated computing system (much less, the parts of the behavior of such a system) without having a good initial hypothesis about the basic principles of organization and functioning of the whole system. There is no reason to assume that the situation can be simpler in the case of reverse engineering the brain. After all, the brain is a real working integrated computing system! It should be mentioned that the critical importance of the problem of system integration in brain modeling was well understood in the early days of cybernetics. Here is a revealing quotation from the neurophysiologist Zopf Jr. (1961) [26] :
"I am intolerant of those who regard the whole of biological data of the phenomena of biological organization and intelligence as not more than a grab bag from which to abstract technological goodies. My intolerance is tempered only by the belief that such casual abstraction may not succeed."
Unfortunately, since the late 1960-s the main trend in brain modeling and cognitive modeling has been toward system fragmentation rather than system integration. The concept of the model for the whole brain has been taboo 1 .
Three general postulates
Let (W, D, B) be a cognitive model, where W is an external world (environment), D is a set of human-like sensorimotor devices, and B is a computing system simulating the work of the human nervous system -for simplicity, call it the brain. The general structure of the cognitive system (W, £>, B) is illustrated in Figure 1 . The system (D, B) will be called a human-like robot or simply a robot, system (W, D) will be called an external system. . Let B(t) denote a formal representation of B at time t, and let t = 0 correspond to the beginning of learning. Though, in the case of the human brain it is difficult to draw a line between the development and learning, this approach can be thought of as a reasonable initial approximation. In the case of a human-like robot, the beginning of learning can be clearly defined. We proceed from the three general postulates:
PI. There exists a relatively short formal representation of B(0) as an abstract computing system.
For the sake of concreteness, we postulate that the size of this representation does not 1 The big rift between symbolic cognitive modeling and dynamical neural modeling opened after the famous criticism of the Perceptron [19] . The original spirit of cybernetics has never been restored. The "neural renaissance" that begun in the early 1980-s has not repaired the damage. Arguably, it increased the rift by creating a form of dynamical extremism with a strong anti-symbolic mental set. A balanced symbolic/dynamical approach to the problem of the whole brain -like the one represented by this report -became next to impossible to promote.
Falsification principle
We treat the problem of the human-like robot (D,B) as a scientific/engineering problem rather than just an engineering (bionic) problem. The difference is as follows. In the case of the bionic approach, one uses biological data only as a source of inspiration for introducing different engineering/mathematical ideas. In the case of the scientific/engineering approach one relies not only on biological inspiration but also on biological falsification.
Falsification principle requires one to pay more attention to the negative facts -the facts that contradict to one's ideas -rather than to the positive facts -the fact that "confirm" one's ideas. This falsification strategy is very difficult to promote in the case of brain modeling and cognitive modeling. Explaining the nature of the difficulties, the neurophysiologist D. Burns (1958) [4] wrote that, (deling with the brain)
it is distressingly easy to find what one is looking for, and remarkably difficult to discern the unsuspected or the unwanted.
To appreciate the importance of negative facts consider the following gedanken experiment. Imagine that we are testing the hypothesis that a certain object is made of gold. We can find many positive facts "confirming" our hypothesis: the object is heavy, it is yellow, it is shining, etc. However, all these positive facts have no value if we can show that the density of the object's material is, say, 8.9g/cm? -that is, much less than the density of gold, 19.3p/cm 3 . This single negative fact has more power than all positive facts taken together. Our hypothesis is false no matter how many more positive facts we can find.
The power of NO follows from the basic properties of the if p then q (p -> q) statement. If implication q is false, then the proposition p is false. However, if q is true, p can either be true or false. That is, false theories can produce true implications. These true implications, however, do not validate a theory. Only false implications have real power. One can say that, in science, YES is just the absence of NO.
The problem of system integration outlined in Section 1.1 provides a powerful falsification test. Let a,b,c,... be some basic properties of the brain as an integrated computing system, and let A,B?C,... be the sets of all possible systems with the properties a,b,c,..., respectively. If one treats all the above properties as constraints on a single integrated model of the brain, then the search area for the corresponding model is the intersection Ap|BP|C... The more properties one considers the smaller becomes the search area. In contrast, if one ignores the requirement of system integration and treats each property separately -just as a biological inspiration for studying the classes of systems with the corresponding "biological" properties -the search area is the union A |J B (J C... Ironically, with the latter approach, the more properties one considers the bigger becomes the search area. The situation is illustrated in Figure 2 . The essence of the falsification principle is well represented by the famous Sir Arthur Conan Doyle quotation:
/CfiTn
When you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
It is worth mentioning that all successful scientific theories rely on refutation. In contrast, all pseudoscientific theories rely on confirmation.
On basic mechanisms and specific constraints
The general relationship between the mathematical theory of the behavior of the cognitive system, (W,D,B), and the mathematical theory of the brain, B, can be meaningfully compared with the general structure of a traditional physical theory. Let us take the classical electrodynamics as an example of the latter theory. To get a specific methodological metaphor, consider the problem of simulating the behavior of electromagnetic field in the Stanford Linear Accelerator (SLAC). The mathematical model underlying this simulation can be represented as a pair (C,M), where C are the specific external constraints (boundary conditions and sources) representing the design of the SLAC, and M are the Maxwell equations describing the basic laws of electricity and magnetism. The broad predictive power of the classical electrodynamics is a result of an adequate separation of the basic constraints, M, and the specific problem-oriented constraints, C. Without such an adequate separation, each new set of specific constrains would lead to a new phenomenological theory. We argue that, similarly, it is critically important to adequately divide a consistent mathematical theory of the behavior of system (W,D,B) into "basic constraints", B, and "specific external constraints", (W,D). That is, to develop such a consistent theory, we should concentrate on reverse engineering the basic principles of organization and functioning of B(t) (particularly, B(0)) rather than on the simulation of the specific cognitive phenomena per se. One can safely say that it would be impossible to reverse engineer the Maxwell equations from the analysis of the behavior of electromagnetic field in the SLAC.
The concept of E-machine
This report deals with a class of brain models (models of B) called the E-machines [6, 7, 8] . In the general case, a complex E-machine (CEM) is a hierarchical associative learning system built from several homogeneous associative learning systems called primitive E-machines (PEM). A PEM can be thought of as a "higher-level" (procedural) formalization of the intuitive notion of a contextsensitive associative memory (CSAM) [9] . This system-level formalization is largely independent of a specific neural implementation. In what follows we first give an abstract description of a PEM and then present a specific example illustrating this concept. The problem of neural implementation of E-machines is discussed in Section 8.
An abstract description
A primitive E-machine (PEM) is a system PEM = (X, Y, E, G, f y , f e , f g ), where
• X and Y are finite sets of symbols called the input and the output set, respectively;
• G is the set of states called the states of encoded (symbolic) long-term memory (LTM) or the G-states. The letter 'G' implies the notion of "synaptic Gain". The G-states represent the symbolic knowledge (software) of an E-machine.
• E is the set of states, called the states of dynamical short-term memory (STM) and intermediateterm memory (ITM), or the Estates. The letter 'E' implies the notion of "residual Excitation" . An E-machine may have several types of E-states representing different temporary attributes (dynamical labels) of the data stored in LTM. The E-states serve as the mechanism for context-dependent dynamic reconfiguration of the knowledge represented by the G-states.
• f y :XxExG -► Y is a function called, interchangeably, the output procedure, the interpretation procedure, or the decision making procedure.
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• / e : X x E x G -► E is a function called, interchangeably, the next Estate procedure, or the dynamic reconfiguration procedure.
• / 5 :XxExG->Gisa function called, interchangeably, the next G state procedure, or the incremental learning algorithm.
Note. A PEM may have other types of states. For simplicity, these states are not included in the above general description.
The work of a PEM is described in discrete time, */, as follows: where x{y) G X, y{y) G Y, e{y) G E, and g{y) G G .
In the next section, we present an explicit example of a PEM. The model is simple enough to be theoretically understandable. At the same time it is sufficiently complex to produce some nontrivial robopsychological phenomena. (The term "robopsychology" is borrowed from I. Asimov Figure 3 illustrates the architecture of a simple PEM. The interpretation procedure f y is divided into four elementary procedures: DECODING, MODULATION, CHOICE, and ENCODING. The model uses a single E-state array, e(i).
HO

An example of a primitive E-machine
The next E-state procedure, / e , is similar, in this example, to the fast-charging-slow-discharging of a capacitor. The model employs a universal learning algorithm, f gi that simply tape-records input/output associations in the LTM. The recorded association gets an elevated level of residual excitation to produce an effect of recency. This is described as the addition to the next E-state procedure.
Variables:
• v G {0,1,...} is a discrete time (the cycle number). 3 • x(:) = x(l),..., x{m) is the input vector with m components. In this example, each component is treated as a symbol. That is, only the equal/not equal relationship is defined. We use a special empty symbol, e, to indicate "no data".
• wx(:) = wx(l),..., wx(m), where wx(j) > 0 (j = 1, ..m) is the vector describing the weights of input symbols.
• gx(:,i) = gx(l,i),... ,gx(m, i) is the vector stored in the i-th location of the Input LTM (ILTM), where i G {l,...n}. • s(:) = (s(l),... ,s(n)) is a similarity array. In general, s(z) is a nonnegative real number representing a similarity between x(:) and gx (:,i) . In this example, we use a very simple criterion of similarity -the number of matching non-empty symbols. Accordingly s(i) 6 {0,1,...,m}.
• e(:) = (e(l),..., e(n)) is an Estate array. Variable e(i) is a nonnegative real number that represents the level of residual excitation associated with the z-th location of the LTM. In this example, we use a single E-state array. In more complex models, several E-state arrays, el(:), e2(:),..., with different dynamic properties can be used.
• se(:) = (se(l),... ,se(n)) is modulated or biased similarity array. In general, se(i) is an element of a real array that describes the similarity affected by the residual excitation.
• r(:) = (r(l),... ,r(n)) is a retrieval array. In general, r(i) is an element of a real array that represents the level of activation of the i-th location of OLTM. In this model, we use a random winner-take-all choice, so only one component of this array, r(iwin), corresponding to the winner, iwin, is not equal to zero. Formally, in this example we need only the variable iwin. The r-array is introduced for the sake of completeness. It does not appear in the following equations. This array is needed in more complex models of primitive E-machines that employ more complex encoding procedures.
•
is the vector stored in the i-th location of the Output LTM (OLTM). In this model, components of gy(:,i) axe treated as symbols.
• y(') = 2/(1)» • • • i yip) is the output vector retrieved from OLTM. In this model the output is read from the winner location of OLTM. Components of y(:) are treated as symbols.
• xy(:) is the input to the OLTM used for writing output data in this memory.
• wptr and wen are the auxiliary variables used to describe the tape-recording learning algorithm. They serve as the write-pointer and the write-enable, respectively.
Parameters:
• a < 0.5 is a parameter that determines the modulating effect of e(i) on s(i) that produces biassed similarity se(i).
• c < 1.0 is a parameter that determines the rate of decay of e(i). The time constant of decay
• m is the number of components in the input vector x(:).
• n is the number of locations in the ILTM and OLTM. In this model, it is the size of all arrays with index i. Namely, s(z),se(i),e(i), gx(:,i), and gy{:,i).
• p is the number of components in the output vector y(:).
Remark. In the experiments discussed in this paper, weights, wx(:), will be treated as parameters. In more complex experiments the pair (x,wx) can be treated as an input. In fact, in this report, we will only need wx(j) = 1, for j = 1, ..ra.
Procedures:
DECODING (computing similarity):
for i = 1 : n (this for is applied to expressions (1), (2) , and (5))
where, T{z) = 1, if z * true, else T(z) = 0 MODULATION (computing biased similarity):
CHOICE (randomly selecting a winner):
where :6 denotes the operation of the random equally probable choice of an element from a set.
ENCODING (retrieving data from OLTM):
NEXT ESTATE PROCEDURE (dynamic reconfiguration): Remark. Expression (6) tape-records input and output vectors in the ILTM and OLTM, respectively, when recording is enabled, wen = 1. For simplicity, in this model, we assume that the weights of input symbols, wx(:), do not affect recording. We will always have wx(j) > 1.0.
ADDITION to the NEXT ESTATE PROCEDURE (the recorded location of LTM, i = wptr, gets initial residual excitation)
Remark. The truth function T(z) is defined in expression (1). Expression (7) adds residual excitation to the location of ILTM with i = wptr, -the location in which data was just recorded. This happens only if recording is enabled, wen = 1. The level of added residual excitation, e(wptr), is equal to the one that would be produced if the input vector x(:) were already recorded in t his location of ILTM, that is, as if gx(:, wptr) = x(:). This trick allows one to avoid introducing intermediate steps in the v -th cycle.
System of references. The model described above will be referred to as Model (2.2) or PEM (2.2), meaning the model (PEM) described in Section 2.2. Similarly, expression (2.2.6) will mean expression (6) of Section 2.2, etc.
3 Experimental system and the list of tasks
Experimental system
The structure of the specific cognitive system, (W,D,B), used in this report is shown in Figure 4 . The system is intentionally simplified to make it as understandable as possible without losing its ability to illustrate the basic ideas. The ideas are scalable and can be employed in much more complex systems arranged on intuitively similar principles.
The robot, (D,B), interacts with an external world, W, represented by a keyboard and a screen. The screen is divided into squares (only one row of squares is shown). For simplicity, we assume that the robot's eye can scan only one square at a time, call it the scanned square. We also assume that the system has some eye tracking device (not shown), so when the robot depresses a key the character appears in the scanned square. It is easy to see that the described external system, (W,D), behaves, essentially, as a RAM. Two motor inputs, addr and din, serve, respectively, as the address and data inputs of a RAM. The sensory (visual) output, dout, serves as the data output . There is no control input similar to the unite-enable input of a RAM. We can say that system (W,D) is in the write mode when there is a nonempty motor input, din. Otherwise, the system is in the read mode. We will formalize this verbal description as the concept of a generalized RAM (GRAM).
The robot's brain is divided into four parts:
1. Associative learning system AS responsible for working memory and mental imagery. The goal of this system is to learn to simulate the external system (W,D). In this case, (W\D) works as a RAM.
2. Associative learning system AM responsible for motor control. The goal of this system is to learn to simulate the teacher.
3. Sensory nucleus NS. In this case, NS works as a multiplexer that switches between the output from the eye, dout, and the output from AS, AS.y.
Note. We use traditional notation in which A.y means variable y of a unit (object) A. We will use Model 2.2. with m = 2 and p = 1 as unit AS. We will use the same model with m = 2 and p = 3 as unit AM. In the case of unit AS we will need residual excitation e(:), so we will have AS.a > 0. In the case of AM, we will set AM.a = 0.
The list of tasks
Here is a list of tasks from the project proposal. Task 1. A theorem providing the proof that a primitive E-machine with a single E-state function can learn to simulate a RAM buffer without moving symbols in LTM.
Task 2. A theorem providing the proof that a primitive E-machine with a one-step delayed feedback can learn to simulate the finite-state part of any Turing machine.
Task 3. A theorem providing the proof that a system consisting of two primitive E-machines, such as the brain of the robot of Figure 4 , can learn to (mentally) simulate any Turing machine -that is, without using an external read/write memory. 
External system as a generalized RAM
In this section and the next one we will go through the following steps:
Step 1. Show that the external system (W,D) of Figure 4 functions essentially as a symbolic RAM buffer. Formalize the notion of such a symbolic RAM buffer by introducing the concept of a generalized RAM (GRAM).
Step 2. Dehne the problem of learning to simulate a GRAM.
Step 3. Prove the theorem of Task 1.
The concept of a generalized RAM (GRAM)
In what follows we formalize the verbal description of the work of the external system shown in Figure 4 as the concept of a generalized RAM (GRAM). • A = {ai,..., On} is a set of symbols called address set For the sake of simplicity we will assume that A = {l,...,n}. In a more general case we would need to define a mapping A<-{l,...,n}.
• D = {d\,..., dm, e} is a set of symbols called data set, where e is the empty symbol meaning "no data".
• M = D x ... xD = D n is the set of memory states represented as memory arrays (mem(l),... ,mem(n)), where mern(i) € D is the data stored in the z-th location of GRAM.
• /:AxDxM-»DxMisa function computing the the output data and the next memory state.
Function / can be represented as the following MATLAB-like program.
(1) if {din == e) dout = mem(addr);
Note. Expressions are numbered independently, starting with (1), in each section. To refer to an expression from a different section we add the section number to the expression number. For example, expression (2.3) is the expression (3) from section 2.
The main difference between a GRAM and a conventional RAM is:
1. In the case of a GRAM, both address and data are treated as symbols: that is, only the equal/not equal relation is defined for the elements of A and D.
2. GRAM is always in the write mode when input data is present, din ^ e. Only if input data is not present, din -e, GRAM is in the read mode. With this approach, we do not need a special control input, e.g., write.enable, to indicate the write or read mode.
3. In the case of GRAM we do not need A = {1, 2,..., n}. We just need to have a mapping A <-► {1,2,..., n}. We also do not need input data symbols to be the same as output data symbols. For simplicity, we used the same data set D for din and dout rather than two different sets, say, D m and D™*. What we need is a mapping, D m <-> D 0 "'. Any mappings A «-> {1,2,... ,n} and D m «-» D 0 "' can be learned, so specifying specific mappings makes no difference. We do not even need one-to-one mappings: several symbols form A could be associated with the same symbol from {1,2 , n}, and several symbols from D m with the same symbol from D^.
Experiment with a GRAM
To get used to the notion of GRAM, it is helpful to follow the experiment with a GRAM shown in Figure 6 , where A = {1,2}, and D = {a, 6, e}. The three-row table in the upper part of the figure displays the input/output sequence of GRAM as a function of discrete time v = 0,1, ..9. The din = e entries are shown as blank squares. The two-row table in the lower part of the figure displays the contents of the two memory locations, mem(l), raera(2) as functions of v. The mem(i) = e entries are shown as blank squares. Let us follow the 10 cycles of the experiment:
Memory is empty: mem(:) = (raem(l),raera(2)) = {e,e). Input: (addr,din) = (l,a), produces output: dout = a, and writes a into location 1: raem(l) = a. v= 1: Memory state is: raera(:) = (a, e). Input: (addr,din) = (2, a), produces output: dout = a, and writes a into location 2: mem(2) = a. Memory state is: mem(:) = (a, a). Input: (addr,din) = (2,e), reads data from location 2: dott* = mem(2) = a. Memory state does not change.
Fixed rules and variable rules
Analyzing the three-row input/output table shown in the upper part of Figure 6 we can discover two types of x -> y rules, where x = (addr, din) and y = dout: address. For example, the output of rule (l,e) -> dout at */ = 7 is dout -a, because the most recently executed fixed rule with addr = 1 is rule (l,a) -► a at 1/ = 6. Variable rules cannot be correctly executed by a learning system that does not save information about the most recently executed fixed rules.
It is useful to view fixed rules as a tool for assigning the right parts of variable rules. With this approach, we can say that the meaning or value of an address symbol in a variable rule depends on the most recent assignment. In the discussed example, each address symbol from A = {1,2} can be assigned any of two meanings (data values) from D -{e} = {a, b}. The problem of learning to simulate a GRAM can be defined as a traditional supervised learning problem illustrated in Figure 7 . Figure 7 is just a redrawn part of Figure 4 in which external system (W,D) is replaced by the GRAM. We keep the name AS for the learning system. We could use any other name since the problem of learning to simulate a GRAM is a problem independent of Figure 4 . Inputs AS.xl and AS.x2 are connected to the addr and din inputs of the GRAM, respectively. Input AS.xy ~ that can be thought of as the desired output -is connected to the output of the multiplexer NS.y. GRAM plays the role of the teacher for system AS.
To prove the theorem of Task 1 we assume that system AS is replaced by Model 2. Training. We assume that training starts at v = I/O and lasts until v «= i/l -1, where v\ is the first moment of examination. We also assume that the following conditions are satisfied during training:
1. sei = 1, and, accordingly, xy = dout. 
Proving the theorem of Task 1
Theorem 1. The PEM described in Section 2.2 (Model 2.2) used as system AS in the experimental setup of Figure 7 can learn to simulate a GRAM from a sample of the GRAM's behavior of the length > n-m.
Proof. We begin with a verbal explanation of the effect of working memory . 1. At the next moment after the rule was recorded in the i-th. location. This is the result of expression (7) from Section (2.2) (expression (2.2.7)) which sets residual excitation at the moment of recording.
If the rule is already recorded and input is x{\)(v) = a, and x(2)(v) = d. In this case, e(i)(v + 1) = 2 is a result of expressions (2.2.1) and (2.2.5).
Once the e(i) = emax is set, we can say that the rule (o, d, d) is placed in working memory. The reason for this statement is that, if we send input x(l) = a x(2) = e the output y(l) will be retrieved from one of the locations of LTM with the highest level of residual excitation among locations for which gx(l, i) = a. Locations for which gx(l, i) ^ a will have s(i) = 0 due to expression (2.2.1). Accordingly, due to expression (2.2.2), for these locations se(i) = 0 independently of the level of residual excitation. This effect of executing the most recent rule placed in working memory will last until e(i) decays below a certain level, eloss. For this model eloss = 1 and the modulating coefficient, a, in expression (2.2.2) must be less than l/emax = .5. Due to expression (2.2.5), the time of decay of e{i) from emax to eloss is 
This statement follows from expression (2.2.6) and the definition of the experiment of training. During training wen = 1, so the training sequence containing all fixed rules is tape-recorded in LTM.
At v -v\ all location of LTM containing fixed rules have e(i) > 0 due to expression (2.2.7).
Let tmax > v2 -i>0. From expression (1) we find that to guarantee that e(i) = emax = 2 will not decay below eloss during the entire experiment of training and examination it is sufficient to have tmax > v2 -vO. This condition is satisfied if
53. Suppose in the course of examination we test AS only in the read mode. That is, we send only inputs addr, din with din = e. Then y(l) will be retrieved from a location ird for which gx(\,ird) = addr and e(ird) has the highest level among all locations with gx(l, i) = addr. If T > rmin, it is guarantied that e(ird) > eloss, so y(l) will be retrieved from the location in which a certain data, din ^ e was recorded most recently and, therefore, y(\) = din. This is exactly how GRAM would react to this input.
54. Let vw and i/r, where ur > i/w be some "write" and "read" moments in the course of examination, such that x(l)(vw) = addr, x(2)(yw) = din ^ e and x(l)(vr) = addr, x(2)(ur) = e. Let there be no other input between vw and vr with the same x(l) and different x(2) ^ e. Due to expression (2.2.5) e(i)(uw -f-1) = emax = 2 for all i 6 {i :
Again, AS reacts exactly as GRAM.
This proves the theorem, since all other possible cases of "writing to working memory" and reading from this memory can be reduced to S3 and S4. D
Why, in this model should the data loss level, eloss, be set at 1? The reason for this is that the residual excitation e(i) = 1 can be created in a wrong location by x(2) = din ^ e. Accordingly, only the residual excitation higher than 1 can be relied upon. The e(i) > 1 can only be the result of decay from level emax=2. The latter level can be set only by the input x(l) = addr, x(2) = din ^ e. This input corresponds to writing non-empty data, din ^ e, to an address, addr, of GRAM.
Why traditional learning systems cannot learn to simulate GRAM
We are going to explain why many traditional learning systems cannot learn to simulate a GRAM. Intuitively, the obvious cause of this limitation is the loss of information about the relative order of observed input events. To formalize this intuition, consider a system M the work of which is represented in the following general form:
where x(v) G X, and y(v) 6 Y).
The work of all learning systems we are aware of can be represented in this general form. Usually, the I/O sequence, 
). We make sure that no other input between v\ and V2 has addr = 1, and din ^ e. At the moment v we send input x(v) = (addr, din)(v) = (l,e). According to the assumption that M simulates the described GRAM the output y(v) must be equal to 6, since din -b was written to addr = 1 last. Let us change the order of inputs at v x and i/ 2 . Now x(v\) = (addr, din)(i/i) = (1,6), and
a). According to the definition of M the output y(v) = dout(v)
must be the same as before, that is, it must be y(i/) = dout(v) = 6. However, the output of the GRAM is now dout(v) = a since din = a was written to addr = 1 last. This contradiction proves the theorem. D
Remark.
Using computer simulation, we tested a number of traditional learning systems against the loss-of-information-about-order criterion specified by the above definition. We found that all tested systems satisfy this criterion, and hence they cannot learn to simulate GRAM. For example, we claim that this result holds for all systems with distributed associative memory and all systems that employ various types of gradient-descent and statistical-optimization learning algorithms. We leave it to the researchers who study these types of learning systems to rigorously prove this interesting negative result.
Recall what was said in Section 1.3. The GRAM simulation problem offers an important falsification test -much more difficult than the famous XOR problem. 6 Learning to simulate finite-state machines (Task 2)
The main steps for solving Task 2
We proceed in the following steps:
Step 1. Define the concepts of a deterministic and probabilistic combinatorial machines and the notion of behavior of type 4.
Step 2. Prove that Model 2.2 with a = 0, TO = 1, p = 1, and sufficiently big LTM (n as big as needed) can be trained to simulate, in principle, any probabilistic combinatorial machine with rational probabilities.
Step 3. Define the concepts of a deterministic and probabilistic unite-state machines and the notion of behavior of type 3. Show that any finite-state machine can be implemented as a combinatorial machine with a one-step delayed feedback.
Step 4. Define the problem of learning to simulate a behavior of type 3.
Step 5. Prove the theorem of Task 2 using Model 2.2 with a = 0,m = 2,p = 3, and n big enough to store the program of the simulated Turing machine.
6.2 The concept of a combinatorial machine: behavior of type 4
Definitions:
1. A deterministic combinatorial machine is a system M=(X,Y,/), where
• X is a finite nonempty set of input symbols called the input set or input alphabet.
• Y is a finite nonempty set of output symbols called the output set or output alphabet.
• / : X -► Y is a function called output function.
The work of M is described in discrete time v as follows :
where, y{y),b € Y, and x{y),a G X.
2.
A probabilistic combinatorial machine is a system M P =(X,Y,/ P ), where
• X and Y are the same as before.
• Note. We use a classification of the general types of behavior and the levels of computing power similar to Chomsky's hierarchy of formal languages [5] . We added type 4 to refer to combinatorial machines. As is known, types 3, 2, 1, and 0 correspond, respectively, to finite-state machines, context-free grammars or push-down automata, context-sensitive grammars, and Turing machines. The lower the type number, the higher is the level of computing power needed to simulate the corresponding type of behavior. In what follows, we are interested only in types 4, 3, and 0.
Two examples of combinatorial machines
To get used to the concepts of a deterministic and probabilistic combinatorial machine it is helpful to understand in details the two simple examples shown in Figure 8 a) and b).
--a b cl At each moment v, the work of machine M can be described with the use of the following algorithm that interprets the table of associations. We will refer to such an algorithm as an interpretation procedure: The following probabilistic interpretation procedure simulates the described machine:
1. Take an input symbol x{v) £ X. For example, let x{v) = 6.
2. Find the set 1(6) = {2,4,7,9,10}. Randomly select an element, i r( t from 1(6). Let ird = 7.
3. Read the symbol from the second raw of the i r d = 7 column and send it to the output. In this case, y(v) = 1.
DEFINITION. The columns of the table of associations are (interchangeably) called associations-rules-productions-commands of a combinatorial machine.
Unlike the case of GRAM, the behavior of a combinatorial machine is fixed and is completely represented by its rules=commands. In the case of a deterministic combinatorial machine, the number of commands is N% = |X|. In the case of a probabilistic combinatorial machine, the number of commands is N£ = |X| • |Y|. Note that, in the case of a probabilistic combinatorial machine, the size of the table of associations must be larger than N£ to represent the probabilities. Only the rational probabilities, m/n, -where m is a nonnegative integer, and n is a positive integer -can be represented in this way.
2:^
Learning behavior of type 4
In what follows we use experimental setup shown in Figure 9 . We assume that PEM is organized as 2) has no effect: se(i) = s(i) because a -0.
Expression (2.2.4) reads the symbol from the selected location of gy(l,:).
Due to the specified conditions of training, at the beginning of examination, v = vl, the table (px(l,:), gy{\, 0)(^1) includes at least once each command of machine M. This proves the theorem.
Note. To accomplish Task 2, it is sufficient to prove the above theorem for the case of a deterministic combinatorial machine. However, it is interesting to mention that if: a) M is a probabilistic combinatorial machine, b) training lasts long enough, and c) symbols from X are presented with equal probabilities, then the resulting table of associations ((gx(l, :) ,gy(l, :))(^1) will correctly approximate the conditional probabilities of M. The longer the training the better will be the approximation. • / : X x Q -> Q x Y is a combined next-state and output function.
Note. Traditionally, /, is divided into two functions, f q :Xx Q -> Q and f y : Xx Q->Y called, respectively, the next-state function and the output function. For our purpose, it is more convenient to combine these two functions into a single function.
The work of M is described in discrete time v as follows : ( 
4) (q(v+i)M»))-ftor), «M)i where, y(v) £ Y, and x(i/)
,a € X.
A probabilistic finite-state machine is a system M P =(X,Y,Q,/ P ), where
• X, Y, and Q are the same as before.
• The work of M p is described in discrete time v as follows : 
Behavior of type 3 as a behavior of type 4 with a feedback
11 is easy to show that any behavior of type 3 can be represented as a behavior of type 4 with a one-step delayed feedback. Let M=(X,Y,Q,fl) be a finite-state machine, and let Ml=(Xl,Yl,f2) be a combinatorial machine, such that XI = X x Q and Yl = Q x Y. The work of Ml is described as follows: Figure 10 : Replacing a finite-state machine by a combinatorial machine with a one-step delayed feedback.
(6) (yl(v),tfl{v)) = fl(xl(v),*2(v));
where x\(v) € X, x2(v) <E Q, y\{y) G Y, and y2{v) € Q.
Let us introduce a one-step delayed feedback from output y2 to input x2. We have
Renaming xl as x, x2 as q, y\ as y, fl as /, and substituting (7) into (6) we get expression (4) describing the work of the finite-state machine M. Since function fl can be selected arbitrarily, any deterministic finite-state machine can be implemented as a deterministic combinatorial machine with a delayed feedback. It is easy to see that the same holds for probabilistic machines.
7 Learning to simulate behavior of type 0 (Tasks 3 and 4)
The main steps for solving Task 3
Step 1. Define the concept of a Turing machine and the notion of behavior of type 0.
Step 2. Show that the tape of a Turing machine can be replaced by a GRAM.
Step 3. Show that system of Figure 12 can be trained in an experiment of supervised learning to simulate the finite-state part of any Turing machine.
Step 4. Prove the theorem of Task 3.
The concept of a Turing machine: behavior of type 0
A Turing machine is a finite-state machine interacting with an external read/write memorytraditionally, a tape divided into squares ( Figure 11) . Theoretically, the tape has infinite length. However, as was explained in Section 1.2, this requirement is not important from the practical viewpoint. Even a finite tape cannot be treated as a finite-state machine because the number of states of such a tape explodes exponentially with the number of squares. A classical Turing machine has a read/write head the position of which indicates the position of a single square of the tape called the scanned square. The address of the scanned square doesn't need to be defined explicitly as it is done in the case of a RAM, or a GRAM (Section 4. S is the set of the next states of mind (the same as the set of the current states of mind). M = {R, L, 5} represent the movements of the head, where R, L, and S mean, respectively, move one square to the right, move one square to the left, and stay in the same square.
X is the set of symbols that can be written on tape (the same as the set of symbols that can be read from the tape).
/ : X x S -► Y is the function represented as the set of quintuples called productions or commands of the Turing machine.
A behavior that can be represented in terms of a Turing machine will be called a behavior of type 0.
Learning to simulate the finite-state part of a Turing machine
It is convenient to redraw the lower part of Figure 4 including system AM, nuclei NM, and Teacher as shown in Figure 12 . We also included the one-step delayed speech feedback s{v) -► s{v -1). Because of this feedback, system AM needs to work only as a combinatorial machine. 2. In traditional theories of symbolic learning, the internal states of the teacher (the target machine) are treated as hidden variables the structure of which must be uncovered by a learning algorithm. We argue that this traditional approach is too restrictive when it comes to the problem of human learning. A human learner doesn't view a human teacher as an absolutely black box. The black box approach to learning leads to implications, such as, e.g., the Gold theorem [16] , that are not supported by observations. As humans, we have a great deal of built-in information about the internal states of other humans. See Section 7.8.
To prove the theorem of Task 2 we will assume that system AM in Figure 12 is organized as Model 2.2 with a = 0, m = 2, and p = 3. As in Section 6.4, we divide the experiment into training and examination.
Training. Training starts at v -z/0 and lasts until v = v\ -1, where v\ is the first moment of examination. The following conditions are satisfied:
1. sei = 1, and, accordingly, xy(:) = yT(:).
At the beginning of training, LTM is empty. That is, for i = 1 : n gx(l,i)(v0) = gx(2,i)(v0) = e; gy(l,i)(vQ) = gy(2,i)(v0) = gy(3,i)(iA)) = e, and wptr(uO) = 1.
3. Learning is enabled: wen = 1. We assume that the LTM is big enough to store all training sequence. That is, n > v\ -i/O.
Examination. At this stage, sei = 0, and xy(:) = y(:). For simplicity, we assume that AM does not learn during this stage, that is, wen = 0. This requirement is not necessary. If n is big enough, AM could continue recording data in its LTM.
Theorem 4. System AM defined above learns to simulate the finite state part of any Turing machine, if each command of this machine is presented at least once at the stage of training.
Proof The theorem follows from the definition of a finite-state part of a Turing machine (Section 7.2 ), the Theorem 3 of Section 6.4, and the fact that any finite-state machine can be represented as a combinatorial machine with a one-step delayed feedback (Section 6.6). D
Replacing TAPE and HEAD by a modified GRAM
Let us compare the (TAPE,HEAD) system of the Turing machine shown in Figure 11 with the external system (W,D) shown in Figure 5 . The read output is similar to dout output, the write input is similar to din input. However, the move input is different from addr input. To resolve this problem we need to slightly improve system (W,D) so it will be to correctly react to move iibols, move € M = {L,R,S}. The easiest way to achieve this goal is to slightly modify the formal description of GRAM from Section 4.1. Instead of expressions (4.1.1) and (4.1.2) we will use the following expressions: 
Computations with the use of external tape
Consider the following experiment with the robot of Figure 3 . Assume that the transducer TR shown in Figure 13 is introduced at the output of centers NM1. This output will produce the move € M = {L, R, S} symbols of the simulated Turing machine.
Training. At this stage NS.sel = 1. The robot's eye is open and the motor system AM sees a symbol dout read from the tape (screen). The teacher forces the robot to perform several example of an algorithm with different input data presented on tape. The examples are selected in such a way that each command of simulated Turing machine is executed at least once.
Examination. At this stage, NS.sel = 1 -the eye is open. The teacher presents new data on tape, positions the robot's eye in the first square (traditionally, the leftmost square), and sets the robot's initial state of mind by forcing the robot to utter the initial symbol. From this moment on the teacher does not interfere and the robot performs computations automatically. Figure 8 . There exist parameters of AM such that after the described Training the robot of Figure 3 passes the described Examination.
Theorem 5. Let Model 2.2 be used as system AM of
Proof The result follows from the Theorem 4 of Section 7.3. D
Computations with the use of imaginary tape
In Section 5.2, we have shown that system AS of Figure 3 , organized as Model 2.2, can learn to simulate any GRAM. The minimum length of the training sequence is m • n, where m is the number of data symbols and n is the number of locations of the simulated GRAM -each data symbol needs to be written at least once in each location of the GRAM. For example it takes 2 • 100 = 200 steps to learn to simulate a tape with 2 symbols and 100 locations. This is a very short training sequence as compared to the number of states of the GRAM. The latter is m n = 2 100 in the case of the GRAM simulating the above tape. Using the described property of system AS we can enhance the experiments of training and examination described in the previous section to allow the robot to learn to perform computations without seeing the external tape. Let us modify the experiments of training and examination as follows. We assume that the robot will never use more than n locations of the external tape.
Training. This stage is similar to the training in the previous section except, the robot must be forced by the teacher to perform all move commands in each of the n locations of the tape. This means that the length of the training sequence increases roughly proportionally to n. (There is no combinatorial explosion of the type m n .)
Examination. This stage is divided into two parts. 2. The teacher forces the robot to scan new data, return to the first square, and utter the initial symbol. From this moment on NS.sel = 0 (the eye is closed), the teacher does not interfere, and the robot performs computations using the imaginary tape simulated by system AS. Figure 3 passes the described Examination.
Theorem 6. Let Model 2.2 be used as both system AS and system AM of Figure 3. There exist parameters of AS and AM such that after the described Training the robot of
Proof. The result follows from the Theorem 1 of Section 5.2 and the Theorem 4 of Section 7.3. D
The C++ program EROBOT (Task 4)
The C++ program called EROBOT allows the user to perform the experiments described in sections 7.5 and 7.6 with the robot of Figure 3 . The simulations confirm that the corresponding theorems do hold. The main screen of the program EROBOT performing the parentheses checker algorithm [20] is shown in Figure 14 . The screen displays three dialog boxes representing the systems: (1) the external system (W,D) -the left box, (2) the mental imagery system AS -the upper right box, (3) the motor control system AM -the lower right box. The user can perform a broad range of experiments with the program and teach it to perform algorithms representable as Turing machines with up to 1000 commands. 7.8 The myth that behavior of type 0 cannot be le«arned
As mentioned in Remark 2 in Section 7.3, some theories of learning equate the problem of learning with the problem of deciphering the structure of a target machine (teacher) observed as a black box by another machine (learner). Usually the target machine is treated as a grammar that has to be identified from the set of sentences [16, 15] . With this definition of learning, the lea: cannot learn to simulate the behavior of the teacher of the type higher than type 3 (finite-state grammars). This general result seems to contradict to our Theorem 1 of Section 5.2 showing that the behavior of a GRAM can be learned -a GRAM is a system of type 0. In fact, there is no contradiction. System AS in Figure 7 (learner) does not treat GRAM (teacher) as a black box. Defined as Model 2.2, system AS has some built-in information about the external system (W,D) -namely the effect of recency associated with the decay of e(i) matches some fundamental physical properties of (W,D). Accordingly, the black box limitations do not apply. We argue that the same holds for the phenomenon of human learning. A human learner does not treat a human teacher, and other external systems as black boxes. It expects these systems to have certain properties. In fact, evolution created biological systems in such a way that they can survive in the real physical world.
Consider the sentence: */ know how you feel". It would be impossible to teach people the meaning of such concepts as "pain", "pleasure", "imagine", iL think", "wait", etc., if our brain had absolutely no built-in knowledge about these concepts. A human teacher and a human learner have similar brains, so the learner knows a great deal about the internal states of the teacher. The whole notion of the black-box-learning is a fallacy.
IMPORTANT. If the behavior of GRAM can be learned, then, according to Theorem 6 of Section 7.6, any behavior of type 0 can be learned. The computer simulation confirms this criti-cally important theoretical result. The result changes the whole attitude toward the problem of human symbolic learning. It means that to be able to learn anything (to be a learning system universal in Turing sense) the human neocortex must use a universal learning algorithm close, in a sense, to the complete memory algorithm used in Model 2.2. Trying to invent a "supersmart" learning algorithm leads to principal limitations on what can be learned. We argue that the principal limitations of the traditional symbolic learning systems stem from this pitfall. 8 On a neural implementation of primitive E-machines (Tasks 6-9)
An example of an associative neural network with temporal modulation
It is helpful to have an intuitive link between E-machines and neural networks. Such a link provides a source of neurobiological heuristic considerations for the design of the models of E-machines and the source of psychological heuristic considerations for the design of the corresponding class of neural models. Figure 15 shows the general architecture of a homogeneous neural network corresponding to a PEM. The architecture was discussed in [7, 9] . Large circles with incoming and outgoing lines represent centers -elements that are assigned certain coordinates in the network. A center with incoming and outgoing lines can be interpreted as a neuron with its dendrites and axons, respectively, or a network functionally equivalent to a "large neuron". Small circles represent couplings -the elements whose position in the network is described by a pair of centers communicating through this coupling. A coupling can be interpreted as a synapse or a circuit functionally equivalent to a "large synapse". The white and the black small circles represent excitatory and inhibitory synapses, respectively. In what follows we ns< the terms neuron and synapse instead of the terms center and coupling, respectively 4 . Figure 15 displays six sets of neurons (Nl, N2, N3, N4, N5, and N6) and 10 sets of synapses (S21, S22, S25, S52, S32a, S32b, S33, S36, S63, S43).
Nj(i) is the i-th neuron from the y-t h set. Skja(n,m) is the synapse between neurons Nj(m) and Nk(n), where 'a 7 is an additional index describing the type of synapse (in case there are several different types of synapses between the sets of neurons Nj and Nk). The V substituted for an index indicates the whole subset of elements (variables) corresponding to the entire set of values of this index. S21(i,:)=(S21(i,l),...S21(i,nl)). S21(:,:) is the same as S21, etc.
The diagram depicts three types of synapses with E-states: el(:),e2(:), and e3(:), serving different purposes. e2(:) is similar to the e(:) of Model 2.2; el(:) describes the effect of lateral modulation that allows the network to decode temporal sequences; e3(:) describes spreading residual excitation producing the effect of broad temporal context. Remark. This neural network corresponds to a PEM more complex than Model (2.2) [7, 9] .
The Input LTM and the Output LTM are implemented, respectively, as the input, and output synaptic matrices, 521 (:,:) and S4(:,:). The network also has some intermediate synaptic memory called Structural LTM (SLTM). This memory corresponds to modifiable connections among neuron decoders, N2, and neuron encoders, N3.
Layer N3 implements a winner-take-all (WTA) choice. The layer has local excitatory feedbacks, S33, and a global inhibitory feedback via neuron N6 -the, so-called, inhibit-every one-andexcite-itself principle. The WTA choice could also be implemented by using inhibitory synapses S33(i2,il) with gains > 1.0 for all synapses except those with i2 = i\ -the, so-called, inhibiteveryone-but-itself principle. In the next section we explicitly describe the dynamics of the WTA. In the discussed case analytical solution is possible.
8.2
The dynamics of the winner-take-all choice
To explore the dynamics of the winner-take-all (WTA) layer let us consider a simplified version of the network of Figure 15 shown in Figure 16 . Unlike the network of Figure 15 the simplified model does not have slow temporal modulation (the E-states). The differential equations describe the the fast dynamics of the postsynaptic potential of neurons N2. All other elements are described by algebraic equations. Neurons N2 are treated as first-order linear threshold elements with the threshold equal to zero. To produce a step-wise (E-machine-like) performance the model has a periodic inhibitory input x in h-The period of this input, call it T in h, must be much larger than the time constant of N2, r (T in /i ;» r) to allow the transient process to reach its stable state during each step. Each neuron of layer N2 has an excitatory feedback with the gain a, and an inhibitory feedback with the gain ß. gfj and g y ki denote the gains of synapses S21(i,j) and S32(k,i), respectively. a\ is the output of neuron N2(i).
Input programmable sinaptic matrix
N4
winner-take-all ßZd, Output programmable synaptic matrix Figure 16 : A simplified version of the network of Figure 15 illustrating the WTA dynamics.
Let all Xj and x ln h (and, therefore, all s,) be step functions of time. Then, for all active neurons from layer N2 (the neurons for which Ui > 0), the solution of equations (2)- (4) 
• rii is the number of active neurones from N2.
• v% (i = 1, ...n) are the values of u, at t=0.
35
-bt\ i -.0 "-bt av ..s n ) will have u t > 0. it can be shown that this equilibrium is unstable if n» > 1. Therefore, in the presence of noise, at the end of the transient response there will be only one winner randomly selected from the set of neurons with the maximum level of Sj.
The C++ program WTA
The WTA program simulates the dynamics of a winner-take-all layer described by equations 2, 3, and 4. The main screen of the program is shown in Figure 17 . The upper dialog box displays the periodic inhibitory input, x in h-The lower dialog box displays the similarity front, s (yellow lines), the positive postsynaptic potential, u, of competing neurons (magenta lines), and the negative postsynaptic potential of the neurons that are turned off by the inhibitory feedback (red lines). If both a and ß are bigger than one, only one neuron with the maximum Si wins the competition. Remark. We are currently working on the extension of the WTA program that would allow the user to explore the competition of spiking neurons. As is known, the winner-take-all choice can be efficiently implemented in a layer of spiking neurons. Besides being biologically more consistent, the latter approach has a number of information processing advantages for the neural implementation of E-machine.
What is a neurobiological interpretation of E-states?
Theoretically, any dynamic variable with a time constant significantly larger than a "psychological" time step, At « 10 -100msec, can provide a physical implementation of a certain type of phenomenological E-state. The psychological time step can be contrasted with a u neurobiological" time step, dt -► 0. For the purpose of a real time computer simulation, dt can be on the order of dt = 1 -10/zsec. We believe that cognitive-level models should be made as independent of the fast neural dynamics as possible.
The majority of the differential equations used in traditional ANN models can be interpreted as describing either the accumulation of chemicals in cellular compartments or the accumulation of In what follows we discuss a possibility of connecting the dynamics of phenomenological Instates with the statistical conformational dynamics of ensembles of membrane proteins. The approach represents a natural system-theoretical extension of the classical Hodgkin and Huxley theory (HH theory) [14] .
In this approach, a single protein molecule is treated as a microscopic probabilistic machine (a Markov system) with transitional probability densities depending on various macroscopic variables such as membrane potential and concentrations of different chemicals (neurotransmitters). The microscopic outputs of all molecules in a certain conformation (state) are summed up to produce the total macroscopic output of an ensemble of microscopic machines in this state. In the case of an ensemble of ion channels, the output is the total ion current. In the case of an ensemble of enzymes, the output is the flow of a chemical (e.g., the second messenger).
The time constants of the macroscopic dynamics of the ensembles of the above machines depend on the values of the transitional probability densities. The smaller the densities the bigger the time constants. In the case of the HH model the time constants for sodium and potassium channels are rather small (milliseconds). In more complex cases, however, it is not unreasonable to postulate time constants ranging from split seconds, to minutes, to hours, and even to davs [13] .
The statistical molecular dynamics of E-states
To formalize the above intuitive description we need to introduce the following definitions.
Definition. A Probabilistic Molecular Machine (PMM)
5 is a system (X, Y, S,a,cj), where
• X and Y are the sets of real input and output vectors, respectively
• S= {SQ, ..., s n -i} is a finite set of states
• a:XxSxS-► R' is a function describing the input-dependent conditional probability densities of state transitions, where a(x, Si, Sj)dt is the conditional probability of transfer from state Sj to state Si during time interval dt, x e X is the value of input, and R' is the set of non-negative real numbers. The components of x are called generalized potentials. They can be interpreted as membrane potential and/or concentrations of different neurotransmitters.
• w:XxS-> Y is a function describing output. The components of y are called generalized currents. They can be interpreted as ion currents and/or the flows of second messengers.
Let x € X, y 6 Y, s E S be, respectively, the values of input, output, and state at time t, and let Pi be the probability that s = Si. The work of a PMM is described as follows:
Summing the left an the right parts of equations 11 for i = 0,..., n -1, it is easy to verify that condition 12 holds for any /.
Definition. An Ensemble of Probabilistic Molecular Machines (EPMM) is a set of identical independent PMMs with the same input vector, and the output vector equal to the sum of output vectors of individual PMMs.
Let N be the total number of PMMs, TV* be the number of PMMs in state Si (the occupation number of state s,), and let e, = Ni/N be the relative occupation number of state s,. We have
i=0
The behavior of the average e~i is described by the equations similar to (11) and (12) .
n-l
üTT>^Q-P Figure 18 : The interpretation of the macroscopic E-states as the occupation numbers of the microscopic states of a PMM.
where a^(x) = a(x, Sj, Sj) describes the rate constant of transfer between states Sj and s*.
The structure of equations 14 and 15 is illustrated in Figures 18 and 19 . The diagram of Figure  19 suggests that an EPMM provides a statistical implementation of a mixed-signal computer with the rate constants serving as input-controlled coefficients (that can serve as switches). This implementation is extremely robust because the properties of the whole computer are determined by the properties of a single PMM. No interaction among PMMs is needed. Variable external connections are replaced by variable internal probabilities, and statistics does the trick. It is tempting to say that, in the same way as statistical mechanics of simple molecules leads to thermodynamics, the statistical mechanics of very complex molecule-machines leads to neural computations.
Another obvious advantage of the EPMM implementation of the dynamics of E-states is that this implementation relies on molecular time -the time constants do not depend on volatile parameters of neurons, synapses, and neural networks.
The C++ program EPMM
The EPMM program allows the user to simulate the dynamics of a cell with up to 10 different types of PMM each having up to 18 states. Two modes of simulation are supported: (1) the differential equation mode (n -► oo), and (2) the Monte Carlo mode with up to n=10000. Remarks:
1. The EPMM formalism gives one a tool for implementing a broad range of sophisticated next E-state procedures. The complexity of such procedures depends on the postulated structure of the PMM's and on the way the EPMM's interact in a cell via membrane potential and second messengers.
2. We use the HH theory as a test case for the EPMM formalism. In the example shown in Figure 20 , two simple PMMs corresponding to sodium and potassium channels, interacting via common membrane potential, produce quite sophisticated spike dynamics. Much more complex dynamics can be implemented in a similar way by using more complex PMMs.
6. From signals to symbols and vice versa. The most likely candidate for the E-machine paradigm is the neocortex. In this metaphor, system AM corresponds to the frontal lobe, whereas system AS corresponds to the other three lobes as shown in Figure 21 . To make the E-machine paradigm practically implementable at the level of the neocortex, the lower levels of the brain must be able to convert sensory signals into sensory symbols, and motor symbols into motor signals. One of the possibilities is that the signal-to-symbol conversion is done by different feature detectors. Each detector would have a fixed sparse ID serving as a unique pointer to this detector. The sets of such IDs would form primary sensory alphabets. Similarly, the units generating primary motor features would have sparse IDs forming primary motor alphabets. With this approach, the higher association areas of the neocortex could deal mostly with symbols represented by the sparse IDs.
6. High dimensionality of sensory devices. On the blessing of dimensionality. One of the striking differences between the signal processing in the biological brain and that in artificial cognitive systems is the dimensionality of inputs and outputs. As an example it is helpful to consider a typical automatic speech recognition (ASR) system and compare it with the human speech recognition (HSR) system [30] .. A typical ASR system described in [31] starts with the 256-dimensional input vector representing short-term Fourier coefficients of the overlapping speech frames sampled 100 times per second. After several steps of intermediate processing, this 256-dimensional vector is transformed into, 39-dimensional vector consisting of 12, so-called, cepstral coefficients (and their two time derivatives), and the, so-called, log frame energy (and its two time derivatives). This 39-dimensional vector is presented to the higher levels of the ASR system for further processing.
The HSR system starts with w 4000-dimensiorial vector representing the output of the inner hair cells in cochlea of each ear. See Figure 22 . This vector can be thought of as some counterpart of the 256-dimensional vector of the short-term Fourier coefficients of the ASR system. The number of cells processing the above auditory input expands to w 90,000 cells in the cochlear nucleus, to % 390,000 cells in the inferior colliculus, to % 580,000 cell in the medial geniculate body of the thalamus, to « 100,000,000 cells in the primary auditory cortex. The firing of the subsets of the latter cells represent the auditory world to the higher levels of the neocortex. How can the higher levels make sense of this extremely high-dimensional input? It is intuitively obvious that there must exist some blessing of dimensionality that is efficiently utilized by the higher levels of the HSR system. The metaphor ''neocortex as an E-machine" provides an insight into the nature of this blessing of dimensionality. The neocortex is a massively parallel system. It does not have time to compute different auditory features on the fly. However, it can efficiently pre-tune the subsets of the already formed feature detectors by changing the E-states. The more feature detectors are formed in the primary auditory cortex, the easier it is for the higher levels of the neocortex (organized as E-machines) to pre-tune the needed subsets of feature detectors depending on context.
Intuitively, the combinatorial possibilities of parallel dynamic reconfiguration associated with the "nonclassicaT symbol processing paradigm employed by E-machines (dealing with functions representing subsets of pointers to activate subsets of "immovable symbols") overcomes the curse of dimensionality. In contrast, this curse plagues all systems that rely on 'classical" symbol manipulation techniques (dealing with pointers to move symbols in memory). This holds for the higher levels of processing in all existing ASR systems we are aware of. 7. Sparse recoding in a hierarchical structure of associative memory. As mentioned before, a complex E-machine (CEM) is a hierarchical associative learning system built from several PEMs. The concept of sparse IDs can be extended to allow the PEMs of higher levels to store data in terms of sparse-recoded references to the data stored in the PEMs of lower levels. This would naturally produce different effects of data compression and chunking (see, for example, [1] ).
Communication via association fibers.
The sparse encoding of symbols addresses the question of how the homogeneous areas of the neocortex of different modalities and levels (treated as PEMs) could efficiently communicate via association fibers. The numbers of association fibers are not big enough to provide crossbar connectivity. In the case of sparse encoding of symbols, several symbolic messages could be sent simultaneously with a low level of crosstalk. This would allow any small subset of talkers to broadcast their sparse-encoded messages simultaneously to large numbers of listeners. The only limitation is that not too many talkers must talk at the same time through the same set of association fibers. As an example, our estimate shows that around m « 50 neuron-talkers can talk simultaneously ton« 10 9 neuron-listeners through k w 10 4 association fibers. That is, any-nl-to-any-n2 communication is physically impossible if nl = nl = 10 9 -it would require 10 18 connections. However, any-m-of-nl-to-any-n2 communication is quite possible if m « 50, and nl = n2 « 10 9 .
9. Computing statistics on the fly depending on context. At the symbolic level, the brain may not pre-compute statistics at the time of learning because statistics depends on context. How could the neocortex compute statistics on the fly depending on context? A sparse encoding of symbols offers a solution to this problem. If we change the procedures of CHOICE and ENCODING to allow several sparse-encoded symbols to be read simultaneously from the locations of OLTM with a "high enough" level of activation, sununing up several sparse vectors produces a statistical filtering effect [7] .
10. Natural language. This is the most challenging and interesting problem that, we believe, is well suited for the E-machine paradigm. It takes less information to dynamically activate the data structures that are already present in the LTM than to create new data structures. Even less information is needed if some data structures are already pre-tuned through the inputs of other modalities. Accordingly, unlike the statements of a formal language, the sentences of a natural language do not need to carry complete information. A hint can be sufficient to remove ambiguity in a given context. This sheds light on why people with similar backgrounds (G-states) and mental sets (E-states) can efficiently communicate via short messages, whereas people with different backgrounds and mental sets have difficulties understanding each other.
Emotions and motivation.
We should mention the problem of emotions and motivation.
Can the E-machine paradigm shed light on this problem? Let us postulate that, at a higher level, there exists some symbolic representation of emotions -otherwise our language would not have the names for our emotional states. If this postulate is correct, the E-machine formalism can be applied to the higher level learning involving emotions. People remember t heir pleasant and unpleasant emotional states. This means that, at a higher level, the effect of positive/negative reinforcement cannot be reduced to the effect of increasing/decreasing the weights of sensorimotor associations. We postulate that, at a higher level, the brain forms associations involving the symbols representing emotions and other observable internal (I) states. The sets of these associations can be dynamically reconfigured depending on context by changing the E-states. This helps to understand why our concepts of "good" and "bad" depend on our knowledge and mental set.
It is easy to imagine a situation when retrieving emotional symbols affects control inputs that change the E-states that, in turn, affect the retrieval of emotional symbols, and so on. This would shed light on the nature of various self-reinforcing loops, such as the well known panic attack loop.
12. Long-term learning. The utility problem. One of the most difficult and, practically, most important problems encountered by traditional AI-type theories of symbolic learning is the, so-called, utility problem [29, 27, 28] -after a sufficiently long time of learning, t be performance of a learning system begins to deteriorate. In contrast, human performance dramatically improves with learning. Our ability to learn increases with learning. We learn how to learn and even how to learn how to learn. The more knowledge we acquire the easier it becomes to learn more. Intuitively, this nonlinear effect is the result of learning with the references to what has already been learned. It also is a result of the brain's remarkable ability to use knowledge acquired in one context in a large number of other contexts -the, so-called, transfer of experience between contexts.
1. It is important not to confuse the behavior aimed at learning (e.g., studying at the Stanford university) with a learning algorithm = data storage algorithm. In a Turing universal learning system, a simple universal learning algorithm can, theoretically, produce arbitrarily complex behavior aimed at learning. We argue that the critical issue for the human-like long-term learning is what information to learn rather than how to store this information in the learner's LTM. Somehow, this critical issue is largely ignored when machine learning is compared with human learning. There is a "gold rush" for the development of all kinds of smart learning algorithms -hundreds of different learning algorithms are already invented. The general believe motivating this research is that the power of the brain is a result of some special learning algorithm(s).
2. It is easy to see that the vision of a "supersmart" learning algorithm is a fallacy. Doing too much pre-processing of "raw" learning information before storing this information in LTM is not a good strategy in the case of a system that must deal with a very large number of contexts. No data storage algorithm can, in principle, know in advance what information may become useful in future contexts. Therefore, a system capable of efficient ly dealing with a very large number of different contexts must rely on the power of an efficient dynamic interpretation (decision making) procedure rather than on a "smart" data storage algorithm. The catch is that the loss of information at the time of learning is irremediable at the time of decision making. Theoretically, a powerful enough interpretation procedure can always make up for a dumb but universal learning algorithm -such as a complete memory algorithm. In contrast, no interpretation procedure can make up for a smart learning algorithm that loses information.
10 List of topics for Phase II (Task 10)
Here is an extended list of possible topics for the Phase II of the MoB project. The specific topics will be selected depending on the available resources.
Setting real-time simulation environment
The C++ simulation environment on a Windows XP personal computer was sufficient for proving concepts at Phase I. In fact, we were able to provide a mathematical proof of the main concepts. This combination of theoretical studies and small scale computer simulations is not sufficient for Phase II.
In most cases, the behavior of large E-machines cannot be understood theoretically. To make a serious progress toward understanding the cognitive possibilities of this class of systems we need to set a development environment allowing real time simulation of hierarchical E-machines with the size of LTM on the order of 10-100GB. Our estimates of the size of t he human brain's LTM are on the order of 10-100TB.
We would like to be able to do several large scale simulations demonstrating the efficiency of the E-machine paradigm for a broad range of cognitive problems that are difficult to solve using conventional computers 6 . These include:
2. Motor Control (a) Afferent synthesis of sequential movements. Synthesizing a complex sequential motor program by pre-tuning the elements of the already learned motor programs. Example: babbling syllables and then learning to produce words consisting of these syllables.
(b) Afferent synthesis of parallel movements. Synthesizing a complex parallel motor program by sequentially pre-tuning parallel components of this program and then executing the whole program in parallel. Example: learning to play piano by training different hands and then producing two hand movement in parallel. The project develops a formalism for bridging the gap between symbolic and dynamic levels of the mathematical theory of the brain. The formalism is based on the hypotheses that the neocortex processes symbolic information in a nonclassical way. Instead of manipulating data in a read/write memory, as the classical symbolic systems do, the neocortex changes the states of dynamic memory representing different temporary attributes of data stored in a long-term memory. This nonclassical symbolic/dynamic computational paradigm is called the concept of E-machine. Intuitively, an E-machine manipulates characteristic functions over the sets of memory addresses of data rather than addresses and data themselves. The main results include: (1) demonstrating the Turing universality of the E-machine paradigm, (2) showing how an E-machine can learn to simulate a read/write working memory without actually re-writing data, (3) demonstrating how the E-machine paradigm can be efficiently implemented in biologically-realistic neural networks with temporal modulation. Several computer simulations supporting the theoretical results were performed. 
